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I shall be telling this with a sigh
Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I-
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the diference.
--Robert Frost
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' Our title references the interests and work of two persons widely known to the
ADR community, whom we are privileged to know and admire. The first part of the title
parodies the widely admired "Variations on a Theme by Hayden" by Johannes Brahms;
we count ourselves among the many persons whom Professor Emeritus Frank E. A.
Sander has showered with his counsel, support, affection, and intellectual insights-and
his love of classical music. The second component deploys the device-phrase-
"philosophical map"-that Professor Leonard Riskin so elegantly used in his article
entitled, Mediation and Lawyers, referenced and discussed in Part III below.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Can a mediator play a constructive role in helping citizens confront and
resolve the most divisive issues of our times? We believe the answer is
affirmative, but we worry that such a view, though richly grounded in our
historical tradition, is now neither widely endorsed nor effectively
implemented.
We belong to a group of dispute resolution professionals who learned
both from mentors and experience that ADR-and mediation, in particular-
offers a philosophical map for conducting problem-solving activities among
fellow citizens that systematically supports and advances our most noble
aspirations for a fair society. Be it the urban riots of the 1960s or the recent,
polarizing events from Ferguson to Baltimore, we thought-and were
inspired-by the perhaps naYve notion that a mediator, in the soaring terms of
our Constitution's Preamble, could effectively trigger disputants to become
"We, the people;" assist citizens to "...form a more perfect union;" work
collaboratively with multiple stakeholders to "...establish justice;" and, in so
doing, "...secure the blessings of liberty to [themselves] and to [their]
posterity."'
At its core, this approach to mediation-this philosophical map-
embraces the right of each participant to be treated with respect; participate
in the decision-making process; have an equal voice in determining the
outcome of the controversy; assume a meaningful role in shaping the
fundamental structures of his or her community; and, significantly, shoulder
personal responsibility for the progress and outcome of his or her
engagement and dialogue.
That map-emphatically-affirms that all participant conduct, including
the mediator and all stakeholders, and activities that occur within the
mediation process' are, constitutionally, justice-based events.
Two questions, then, arise about this mediator's map that we find
persuasive: first, is it coherent? Second, if coherent, does it comport with
contemporary mediation practice?
2 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
' Historically captured by the acronym, ADR.
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We believe that the answers are, respectively: yes-and not entirely.
Our hesitation to answer affirmatively stems from our deep concern that the
approach to mediation that seems widely embraced by law-trained
mediators-what Riskin and Welsh describe as a 'thin vision' of
mediation4-appers to operate at cross purposes with this conception of the
mediator's philosophical map. Specifically, a "thin" approach eliminates as
inappropriate the use of mediation in matters laced with social justice
dimensions.s
II. BACKGROUND
Professor Frank E. S. Sander's imprint on the vision and development of
the contemporary dispute resolution movement is deep, sustained, and
engaging.
Many scholars and practitioners point to his presentation at the 1976
Pound Conference-"Varieties of Dispute Processing" 6 -as a
transformative moment in the development of the ADR field
In his "Pound" remarks, Professor Sander encouraged lawyers, judges
and court personnel to examine how the legal profession, in his later phrase,
fit the forum to the fuss.' He and others, including then Chief Justice Burger,
noted that trying to resolve every controversy filed in a court by conducting
an adversary trial was misconceived in at least three ways: (i) at a practical
level, the potential 'mismatch of process to grievance' led people not to
pursue their claims due to economic, time, or psychological costs; (ii) the
litigation experience and outcome often left clients feeling frustrated because
they believed that they did not have an opportunity to address and discuss
their primary concerns; and (iii), even when their claim was affirmed, the
judicial remedy often failed to meet their interests.
Professor Sander then offered two broader observations. He noted that, at
a policy level, the use of alternative procedures might be warranted because
the projected increased caseload numbers would require judicial resources
that far outstripped judicial capacity or the likely political willingness to
finance additional judgeships. And, at a normative level, he questioned
whether the judicial process, even if accessible to all and ideally conducted,
effectively addressed litigant concerns in a manner that promoted other
4 Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy Welsh, Is That All There Is? 'The Problem' in Court-
Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv 863 (2008).
51d
6 Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties ofDispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976).
7 Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49, 49-68 (1994).
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values, including civility, respect, and constructive interpersonal
relationships following the outcome.
All of this is powerful background setting. As many know, Professor
Sander, in his paper, proceeds to analyze how it might be possible to develop
multiple dispute resolution procedures that could then be matched to-or
available for-parties and their particular type of dispute. In the terminology
of our contemporary technological society, he envisioned an arrangement in
which the court system would not offer simply a "one size fits all" justice
procedure to all participants but would support parties tailoring-
customizing-their process to meet their dynamics. Many have justifiably
identified the picture emerging from Professor Sander's remarks as
constituting the conceptual framework for launching what today we refer to
as Multi-door Courthouse.8
While some scholars write that Professor Sander's paper "officially
launched" the field of ADR,' they, regrettably, have systematically ignored
two other significant insights Professor Sander shared at that time. What
were those?
First, he noted that creating multiple dispute resolution processes might
actually increase the number of disputes that warrant attention. In his words:
"...[O]ne byproduct may be not only to divert some matters now handled by
the courts into other processes but also that it will make available those
processes for grievances that are presently not aired at all.""o Second, he
observed: "At one time, perhaps the courts were the principal public dispute
resolvers. But that time is long gone.""
Why are those insights so stunning?
His first remark invites us to expand the notion of what constitutes a
"harm," (a "grievance," in Professor Sander's terminology). His insight
' Sander, supra note 6, especially at page 131 where Professor Sander suggests that
one might enter a dispute resolution center with a directory signaling different rooms for
mediation, arbitration, ombuds, trials, etc.
9 See i.e., CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE
ADVERSARIAL MODEL (2d ed. 2010) at xxxvii. But even Professor Sander is more humble
than that, for in those very remarks he acknowledges the important initiatives of multiple
persons in the preceding decades that stimulated thinking about and use of non-trial
dispute resolution processes for resolving controversies.
'Old. at 113.
" Id. at 125. He noted the existence of specialized tribunals, such as those created
by the development of administrative law (126) as well as the judicial system itself
developing specialized courts (family and tax) or, as was his hope, the creation of
multiple process options for parties.
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implies that expanding the "jurisdictional reach" for problem solving
requires the public (including courts) to assume responsibility for providing,
or at least identifying, dispute resolution fora to address these multiple
grievances. Stated more provocatively, his comment challenges the notion
that a disputant must first assert or restrict his complaint to only those
matters that constitute a 'legal cause of action' in order to initiate or gain
access to a publicly-identified or supported dispute resolution process. 12
His second observation strongly asserts that there must be multiple
forums in our communities, not just courts, for conducting problem-solving
conversations in fair, efficient ways.
These are the two "variations" we want to explore. We believe that they
invite a robust, energizing conception and vision of using mediation to
advance justice considerations.
We believe that consistent with Professor Sander's insights-and a
crucial part of our 'horizon'-is the implicit suggestion that law-trained
individuals should be involved in assisting citizens resolve disputes that
erupt in some, if not all, of these expanded categories of "grievance." Why
should lawyers be involved? Why not leave dealing with these significant
challenges to talented personnel, law-trained or not, who work as elected or
appointed public officials, direct local government outreach offices, or
design and implement economic and social service programs, or operate
community mediation programs?
A cynic may respond that it is because lawyers will lose economic
business if they are not involved.
But we don't believe that captures what Professor Sander was
suggesting. Consider the following: Ferguson and Baltimore erupt; college
students, especially females, report sustained incidents of unwanted, forced
sexual activity and harassment; citizens divide when discussing appropriate
practices for addressing an increased immigrant presence in their
community. And the list of disputing contexts that confront us can readily
expand to include controversies about how to best address matters relating to
gun-use; cyber-bullying; privacy invasions; and climate change. There is no
shortage of disputing contexts that divide communities.
" Id. at 113. Importantly, he went on to observe: "Whether that will be good (in
terms of supplying a constructive outlet for suppressed anger and frustration) or whether
it will simply waste scarce societal resources (by validating grievances that might
otherwise have remained dormant) we do not know."
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Where are courts and lawyers in assisting persons to address these
matters? Barely visible. Why?
The conventional response is that such controversies often cannot be
properly or comprehensively viewed as legal causes of action; they must be
framed differently: the protestors' conduct in the street constitutes a "riot,"
thereby making it a "law enforcement" problem; sexual harassment incidents
require an institution-e.g. a university- to generate a 'policy' to address it,
not a court to develop one; and citizen confrontations involving law
enforcement practices, immigration challenges or environmental challenges
are 'political issues' for elected or appointed public officials to handle, not
legal issues for the courts. When conflicts are interpreted in these ways, the
legal profession escapes any responsibility for addressing them.
This is not an arbitrary or blind response. It is thoughtful. And it would
not be disgraceful but for what we believe to be two wide-spread, justifiable
beliefs: first, these social challenges raise questions of fair treatment and
justice among citizens in our communities; second, lawyers and courts exist,
in large measure, to establish justice and, more robustly, develop and sustain
a culture that respects the rule of law.
So, at least our conclusion-perhaps not others-is that the apparent
absence of lawyers and law-trained personnel in leadership roles in such
settings is distressing. Professor Sander's first remark suggests that there
should be a role for the legal profession in these matters-that perhaps
controversies involving these concerns should be made to fit on the
philosophical map of a law-trained mediator.13 We believe that the history-
and leadership-of the contemporary ADR initiative triggered 50 years ago,
at least in the United States, embraced that perspective.
III. USING ADR IN DISPUTES THAT DIVIDE COMMUNITIESL
A. Context
The recent visible controversies that expose deep, sustained divisions
within our communities are regrettably not new to our nation's history. We
focus only on obvious episodes in the past fifty years.
13 We are borrowing these terms from Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers,
43 OHIO ST. L. J. 29, 44 (1982) in which he introduces the notion of a lawyer's
philosophical map and then distinguishes it from that of a mediator.
14 Much of this section comes from Chapter I of JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION
THEORY AND PRACTICE 4-12 (3d ed. 2001).
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The urban riots of the 1960s sharply exposed how our communities were
divided along racial, economic and social lines. Citizen activists engaged in
political movements to advance multiple causes, including calling for
expanding civil rights; eliminating poverty; increasing diversity in
universities along student, faculty, and curricular dimensions; terminating
U.S. military involvement in Vietnam; and reducing the use of nuclear
power. Many protests triggered confrontations that were vicious, brutal, and
costly. The disruptions tore at the fabric of our democratic life-style; they
challenged our notion of what constituted the rule of law. How did we
respond? We deployed the approaches with which we were
comfortable and to which we were committed: protestors were
arrested; persons who engaged in "lawless behavior" were advised
that authentic acts of citizen civil disobedience required the protester
to publicly, not covertly, "break the law" and to accept incarceration
as the legitimate consequence; and disgruntled citizens were
encouraged to "change the system by working from within" by
participating in the political process at the local, state or federal level.
In hindsight, it is easy to identify the fundamental drawback to
having used these traditional-and cherished-responses: first, the
parties most affected by the matters in question could not discuss the
concerns that were most significant to them-they were compelled to
answer what they perceived to be tangential charges, such as
trespassing or failure to follow a lawful order to disperse the crowd.
Second, persons charged with law violations did not have the political
standing or reputation to engage the interests and time of political
leaders or institutional representatives; they were effectively
disenfranchised-and for multiple reasons.
In short, parties living with the problems were effectively
excluded from participating in resolving them. Understandably, they
proceeded to engage in conduct that was designed, in part, to provoke
attention and command dialogue.
The use of mediation in the 1960s and 1970s-triggered and made
possible by significant funding commitments from philanthropic
foundations " and governmental initiatives-can be viewed as an
"1 The Ford Foundation, in 1968, provided significant funding to the American
Arbitration Association as well as to Theodore Kheel's Automation House (later the
Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution) to engage in such experimentation.
Substantial grants and funding during the 1970s supported experimentation in
intervening in social controversies over environmental-related matters, for which Gerald
Cormick, Jane McCarthy, Howard Bellman and Lawrence Susskind were early pioneers
as interveners and dispute systems designers.
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experimental, then structured, response to meet this fundamental
"participation" challenge.16
B. Personnel
Who were the persons who assumed leadership or visible
mediation roles in these early efforts? They were individuals who
reflected strikingly different backgrounds. They included, among
others: James Laue, an eminent theologian and activist academician;
Theodore Kheel and Ronald Haughton, each nationally prominent
labor mediators and arbitrators; Sam Jackson and Willoughby Abner,
two African-American community and political activists and former
mediators with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service who
became the first and second directors of the National Center for
Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration Association; and
Linda Singer and Michael Lewis, attorneys with a commitment to
experimenting with mediation's use in prison settings. On the
government side, the Community Relations Service of the U.S.
Department of Justice, a creature of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
provided comparable services utilizing the talents of multi-disciplined
individuals with backgrounds ranging from youth services work to
community economic development. And the Department's Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) program provided
targeted grants to support community-based mediation initiatives.
C. Disputes
In what types of situations did these and other individuals become
involved? They intervened in disputes involving citizen opposition to
the implementation of court-ordered school desegregation plans;
controversies between police departments and citizen groups over law
enforcement practices; environmentalists and developers; school
districts and parents; universities and protesting students; and Native
Americans and United States citizens." Their involvement was fluid:
defining and measuring what constituted "success" was part of the
experiment. Results were uneven, though everyone appreciated how
significant a resource investment was required to sustain such efforts.
'
6 ALFINI, supra note 14, at 7.
" An account of selected activities is reported in R. GOLDMANN, ROUNDTABLE
JUSTICE (1980).
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D. Aspirations
What energized such experiments? It was, at least in part, a
shared vision that creating a forum in which disputing parties could
meet to discuss their concerns and jointly engage in problem-
solving-and to take that forum affirmatively "to the participants"
rather than wait for an invitation for engagement-would enhance the
dignity of citizens' lives. The values embraced in that vision,
consistent with the democratic ideals stated with such power in the
country's founding political documents, include the beliefs that
meeting in such a setting would affirm each stakeholder as democratic
partners, engender citizen responsibility and accountability, establish
a base for triggering citizen imagination to design and implement
effective programs, foster and sustain relationships, and create a sense
of shared responsibility for institutional practices.
E. Outcomes
Why did their efforts enjoy some success? The individual trailblazers
noted above had significant experience in, and a comfort level with, dealing
with disputants who themselves were immersed in hostile conflict with one
another, had a mutual stake in their institution's survival and public
reputation, and used collective bargaining and mediation to develop shared
governance rules. So when these interveners envisioned becoming engaged
as mediators in such social conflicts as school desegregation confrontations
or prisoner hostage negotiations, they did so hoping that their mediating
experience in fiercely contested and strike-riddled union-management
collective bargaining confrontations might be transferrable. Though they
quickly acknowledged that the union-management relations paradigm was
not a perfect template, they noted significant similarities: managing the
participation of multiple parties and constituencies; addressing significant
topics; structuring and sustaining numerous negotiating sessions to forge
partnerships; appreciating the need to conduct conversations in a neutral
forum; and recognizing that their intervener conduct itself could generate
significant public, and perhaps controversial, consequences.
With this modicum of similarities, and with an optimism that there was
no such thing as an "intractable" dispute, these interveners, and others like
them, attempted to make significant contributions to help resolve these
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explosive, polarizing disputes that, Professor Lon Fuller, observed in another
setting, were "polycentric." "
This intervener's "map" that perceived such possibilities was certainly
not that which Professor Riskin was later to describe as the standard lawyer's
philosophical map;' 9 perhaps that explains why the legal profession -qua
profession did not assume a leadership role in trying to meet these
developments.
F. Transition.
Much has occurred in the dispute resolution world since the initiatives
referenced above took place. Two developments are prominent: the formal
court system, at both the state and federal levels, has assumed a primary role
in promoting, if not mandating, the use of ADR for litigation-related
conflicts; and the intellectual home and context for studying mediation, at
least in the United States, has shifted significantly from its dominant homes
of schools of industrial and labor relations and its cognate disciplines of
economics and psychology to its massive presence among legal scholars.
Though business school, peace studies and international diplomacy remain
important sources of academic disciplinary engagement, we do not believe
there is much question that the "elephant in the room" regarding concepts
and practices shaping mediation theory and practice in the United States is in
the legal academy.
Given these developments, we can pose the question to the legal
profession more directly: given its predominance in the field, doesn't the
legal profession have an obligation to play a central role in helping to resolve
disputes that divide our communities? Despite the contemporary history
sketched above in which persons regularly used mediation in such contexts,
it appears that any vision of such a possibility has been sharply reshaped-
undercut-from two distinct directions.
IV. THE PHILOSOPHICAL MAP OF CIVIL TRIAL MEDIATION
PARTICIPANTS.
There are multiple players in today's mediation world. One dominant
domain-perhaps its most influential sector-involves those mediators who
IS Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 3, 32-
33 (1963).
" ALFNI, supra note 14.
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assist lawyers and their clients resolve cases that would otherwise be litigated
in state or federal court.
Many acknowledge that most litigation ends without an adjudicated
outcome. A growing number of lawsuits are settled in privately conducted
mediation sessions, and those settlements range across case-types, including
catastrophic personal injury cases, medical malpractice claims, business
contract disputes, employment discrimination complaints, and intellectual
property controversies, to name a few. For the most part, private
practitioners, not court personnel, mediate these matters.
What does "mediation" in such matters involve? One distinguished
advocate recently described the mediation of legal disputes as follows:
Our profession has changed... I tried an injury case nine months after
I was admitted. Now the civil trial is a dinosaur, nearly extinct-a
loss of the soul of the profession, some maintain. Almost time,
perhaps, for a proper Irish wake. Yet, those ancient days of picking
jury after jury and battling adversaries and judges were the joy that
made the law exhilarating and rewarding.
But no more. Instead of inspiring a lethargic jury, we sit in lifeless
conference rooms and advocate before restrained, thoughtful
mediators with nervous eyes. We argue with all the passion of an
accountant at tax time. It's business, everyday business, lacking the
fervor of cross-examination, the thrill of closing argument.
Now, every case is mediated-and some numerous times. After all,
mediation settles cases efficiently and frugally. Parties walk from
those rooms without exhilaration or despair, but with relief that the
contentious dispute will no longer consume their thoughts.20
After he offers thoughtful advice about how an advocate should prepare for
and participate in a mediated conference, that writer concludes:
Ultimately, the decision to settle is a business one. Can I do better at
trial? Few cases allow you to answer affirmatively and definitively.
The overwhelming majority should be mediated. Not that much fun,
but it works.21
20 Kenneth P. Nolan, Mediation, 39 LITIGATION J. 59 (2013).
2 1Id at 60.
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We find nothing stimulating, or frankly, satisfying, about this image-this
picture-of "legal mediation": conversations in a "lifeless" room?
Conducted by a "restrained" intervener? Involving advocates communicating
arguments in a "dull, boring presentation," all so that parties make a
"business decision" that enables them to leave "without exhilaration or
despair?"
That approach might be effective in the litigation setting the author
describes. It is a clear mismatch, though, for possible intervener service in a
social conflict, where engaging appropriate stakeholders might involve: (i)
convening parties on a street corner at midnight rather than at a scheduled
time in a comfortably-appointed conference room; (ii) listening to partisan
advocates communicate arguments in electrifying, perhaps provocative,
ways; (iii) conducting dialogue in a manner that generates trust and
confidence to develop resolutions that require more than one party writing a
check to pay another; and (iv) concluding the gathering with participants
feeling confident that, whether or not they secured agreement, they had
participated meaningfully in a problem-solving process.
What accounts for what we observe as two distinct visions of the
mediation process? One explanation derives from the insight that those who
participate in the process of mediating legal disputes view it as "simply
business" while the other views it as a justice event. Is there anything wrong
with having differing conceptual contexts? Many are quick to assert that it is
appropriate to use different mediation models to meet different needs.22 They
argue that mediation philosophies and approaches that could be effective for
civil litigation cases might not be apt for addressing matrimonial cases, let
alone divisive community conflicts. Indeed, some would note, the Riskin
grid licenses all such approaches.2 3
That is an important, valued observation, but it is not persuasive. Why?
Let's apply the same observation to the following hypothetical: assume
that in a bench trial of a civil case, judges in City X prohibit lawyers who are
22 Dean and Professor Emeritus, H. Jay Folberg, made this comment in his public
remarks at the JDR Symposium, January 30, 2015, in Columbus, Ohio. See John
Bickerman, The Mediator's Role: As Little As Possible But As Much As Necessary, 6
ACRESOLUTION 14 (2007), for similar sentiment and appeal.
23 Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 111 (1994). Riskin notes that the grid was intended
to be descriptive of mediator behavior, not normative. Id Nonetheless, many
practitioners cite the grid as licensing all such approaches. Id
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representing their clients from making opening statements or cross-
examining witnesses; the judges' rationale is that advocate opening
statements are polarizing, not helpful, and that judges are skilled at assessing
witness credibility without assistance from an adversary counsel. By
contrast, judges presiding over such trials in City Y, geographically removed
from City X but within the same state jurisdiction, permit such advocate
conduct.
Would our observation of this situation be that what works in one place
may not be appropriate in another, yet they are all civil trials?
We believe that such a response would make us pause. Why?
We acknowledge and accept latitude in having some trial procedures
reflect local culture. We believe, though, that the rules of state or federal
civil procedure embrace the principle that a necessary component of a civil
trial is the concept of due process-and that although that concept can be
satisfied in multiple ways, the absence of some features, such as providing
notice to parties of the nature of one's charge and an opportunity to prepare a
response, the capacity to discuss or evaluate in some manner the credibility
and thoroughness of the evidence presented by other participants, or the
absence of some standard similar to burden of proof, substantially diminishes
if not completely removes due process values from the activity. And we
believe that such removal, even if endorsed by all participants in the name of
efficient claim processing and the exercise of party self-determination,
should not necessarily be determinative. Why? Because permitting the
"trial" to occur without due process principles permits the participants to
wrap themselves in the aura of participating in a 'justice event' when, in fact,
we would charge it as a hoax-or, more generously, their resolving a
"business dispute."24
This is not to say-nor should one insist-that mediation must be
conducted in one and only one way. But mediation practices should bear a
"family resemblance" to one another so that process participants and the
general citizenry have a shared understanding of the meaning of the
activity. 25 The question, then, is whether those trained and skilled at
mediating legal disputes are, in principle, performing the same kind of work
as those interveners who might attempt to advance problem-solving
dialogues over divisive community conflicts. We are skeptical-
24 We develop and expand on this conclusion in a related discussion below in Part
III.
25 SeLUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONs 65-71 (1953).
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disappointed, but skeptical-that there is much resemblance or
transferability.
The mediation of legal disputes described above appears to reflect what
Riskin and Walsh describe as a "thinning vision"2 6 of mediation. Though
included in Riskin's grid, we believe that such mediating conduct more
closely resembles practices that have led Riskin and Welsh to ask: "Is That
All There Is?"27 Implicit in the Riskin/Welsh question is their criticism that
mediation is conceptually capable of embracing more robust dynamics than
the process as described by Nolan28 . Not only might mediation advance a
different participant experience in the problem-solving process-
engagement, participation, and personal accountability-but also trigger
participants to view their controversy in more flexible terms. Indeed, Bush
and Folger's powerful theoretical framework of transformative mediation
targets this type of 'thinning' as the central misunderstanding of what
mediation, distinctive among dispute resolution processes, is capable of
achieving. 29 To attribute words to Bush and Folger, but in their spirit, "thin"
legal mediation effectively demolishes "The Promise of Mediation."
But this 'thinning' direction of mediation practice is not simply the result
of elevating economic efficiencies to be the clients' highest priority. Rather,
it appears to us to stem from a more pervasive source: namely, the "lawyer's
philosophical map" that Riskin described has now reshaped and overtaken
the problem-solving framework of the mediation process. What do we
mean?
Riskin described the lawyer's philosophical map as consisting of two
features: first, dispute outcomes have only winners and losers; second, those
outcomes are determined by a third-party intervener-a judge-who
impartially applies public rules to the legally-admissible facts at hand.30
How does that map influence how law-trained persons conduct or
participate in a mediation conference? Nolan's comments suggest that the
impact is straightforward: first, mediation participants define and restrict the
issues discussed in mediation to those constituting the lawsuit; second, the
mediator conducts the session in a way that focuses primarily on examining
26 Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1
(2001).
27 Riskin, supra note 4.
2 8 Nolan, supra note 23.29 See ROBERT BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (2d ed. 2004).
30 "(1) that disputants are adversaries-i.e. if one wins, the others must lose-and (2)
that disputes may be resolved through application, by a third party, of some general rule
of law." Riskin, supra note 13.
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the relative strengths and vulnerabilities of each party's legal case and their
respective BATNA, with the goal of positioning participants to make an
economic ("business") decision about whether to settle or pursue another
31
option
What is the practical consequence of conducting the mediation process
with this map? It makes it irrelevant for participants to embrace the
conventional wisdom that each party should examine their interests, not just
their positions;32 it reinforces the dominant, pervasive prism that a lawyer
and her client must "bargain [negotiate] in the shadow of the law." 33
In short, the analytical framework for participating in the mediation of
legal disputes is identical to the central tenets of preparing to conduct a trial;
the fact that the intervener has no authority to impose a binding decision on
the parties, while important, does not change that advocate orientation or
practice.
Quite obviously, those persons who participate in the mediation session
that deploy this framework must, and do, display admirable analytical and
rhetorical skill-sets. And, as Nolan reports, the process so conceived and
executed helps parties move ahead.
But such an approach offers no constructive context for bringing together
disputing stakeholders around issues of significant community or
institutional life. Why? The legal mediation framework operates within a
system that "tees up" the mediation session by initially identifying some, if
not all, necessary participants, the issues in controversy, and the range
presumptive remedies. In a significant sense, the legal system defines what
constitutes "a case." By contrast, in a divisive community conflict, the
framework itself-what is 'the case'-must be developed and built by the
participants themselves; with a mediator's assistance, parties identify
appropriate participants to the conversation; examine concerns and practices
that matter to them, whether or not they constitute 'legal causes of actions'
(Sander's reference to 'grievance); engage in bargaining that is not
constrained by "the shadow of the law," since the relevant law might, itself,
be the very matter that needs adjustment; and establish engagement
protocols-"issues of entry"-that, for a mediator, involve making exposed
judgments impacting power relationships and bargaining equality among
potential participants.
So we are left disappointed. The legal profession, qua profession, with
its stunning depth of talented, insightful, individuals who are trained and
11 Nolan, supra note 23.32 See, e.g., ROBERT MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING 35-37 (2004).
33 Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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attuned to examine considerations of fair treatment, respect, dignity, and
problem-solving, appears to have embraced an approach to conducting the
mediation process that is narrow in focus, non-inclusive in participation, and
privileges economic outcomes. That approach is not consistent with the
history of mediating efforts referenced earlier and, regrettably, will likely
result in depriving the community "writ large" of their talents and leadership
in helping community citizens address and resolve explosive divisive
disputes.
The absence of law-trained practitioners from serving as interveners in
divisive community conflicts 34 is not the result simply of deploying the
traditional lawyer's philosophical map. The mediator's philosophical map
for intervening gets reshaped-contracted-from a different direction as
well.
V. THE MEDIATOR'S PHILOSOPHICAL MAP THAT CELEBRATES
"SELF-DETERMINATION"
Many who advocate using mediation to resolve conflicts cite the
mediator's duty to promote party "self-determination" as her most important
professional responsibility.35
Unlike a judge, Standard I of The Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators prescribes that the mediator's job is to promote the exercise of
party autonomy with regard to both process and outcome.36
3 We wish to continuously emphasize that we do not believe that it is necessary for
one to be law-trained in order to be a skilled, effective mediator of divisive community
disputes. We referenced in Section III (B), for illustrative purposes, a few individuals
who effectively executed the mediator's role and, importantly, reflected multiple
backgrounds and profiles. We focus on the law-trained individual in recognition of the
significant role that s/he plays in current mediation practice, and specifically in order to
explore whether persons with concentrated studies in and insights regarding principles of
due process and advocacy skills can, within an appropriate conception of the mediation
process and role of the mediator, participate in a manner consistent with professional
obligations.
3 A representative statement to this effect appears in Timothy Hedeen, Coercion
and Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: All Mediations Are Voluntary,
But Some Are More Voluntary than Others, 26 THE JUST. SYS. J. 273, 274 (2005).
36 See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard I (AM. ARB.
ASS'N, ET. AL. 2005). The mantra, "promote self-determination," takes on the sound, if
not substance, of the libertarian philosophy, though, of course, approaches such as
transformative mediation support party empowerment from a different ethical
framework.
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What is the practical effect of celebrating party "self-determination"? It
has played out in multiple ways and settings. The following examples shared
at professional meetings are illustrative:
If mediating parties want to discard joint sessions, then, in
supporting the "exercise of party self-determination," a mediator
should support this party choice.
If all parties agree that one party will pay the mediator's fee, the
mediator should accept the compensation arrangement.
If the proposed mediator was a former law partner of one of the
advocates participating in mediation, and that prior relationship is
disclosed and everyone (in practice, the lawyers for the parties)
agrees to proceed, the mediator should do so in the name of 'self-
determination.'
And what price might a mediator pay for not supporting such party choices
of "self-determination?" She will not be hired.38
Designers of court mediation programs embrace support for the self-
determination principle as well. In the family law area, for instance, policy
makers, concerned that an advocate representing a client might distort or
undermine party participation and self-determination, enable the mediator to
restrict the participation of a party's legal counsel to either a non-speaking,
observer-status only or exclude them entirely. 39
This picture of supporting party autonomy-"do whatever you find
acceptable"-is problematic. Why?
Initially, this principle appears to affirm a profoundly significant ethical
norm, particularly in our culture: promote, celebrate, and cherish individual
autonomy.
" See separately reported studies of mediator conduct by Thomas Stipanovich,
Insights on Mediation Practices and Perceptions and Jay Folberg, The Shrinking Joint
Session, in DISP. RESOL. MAG. 4-19 (Winter 2016).
38 Eric Galton & Tracy Allen, Don't Torch the Joint Session, DisP. REsOL. MAG. 25
(Fall 2014).
3 The mediator has authority to exclude counsel from participation in the mediation
proceedings pursuant to this chapter if, in the mediator's discretion, exclusion of counsel
is appropriate or necessary. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3182(a) (West 1994).
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But stating the autonomy principle in this way is a red herring. Why?
We live in a political community. We must interact with one another,
preferably in a non-violent manner. But the vision of mediation that makes
'self-determination' the 'trumping' value eradicates the distinction between a
party exercising autonomy and her acting selfishly: "I will do what I want,
and if you won't help me, we won't settle." That approach systematically
cements power disparities into the very foundation of the dispute resolution
procedure, thereby rendering ineffective, if not meaningless, the significant
concepts of party participation, problem-solving, crieativity, and
responsibility; these latter concepts become wasted words, for the "my way
or the highway" claim of autonomy is simply the exercise of raw power.
How might this claim of "self-determination" arise in ways that clash
with mediation being viewed as a 'justice' event? Regrettably, it does not
take much imagination to envision a hypothetical: a party or stakeholder, in
the name of exercising self-determination, refuses to participate in mediation
because of his or her discriminatory attitudes and convictions towards their
counterpart's or mediator's ethnic, racial or religious background. To put it
less charitably, exercising self-determination can support strikingly bigoted
or offensive behavior; if the mediation process design does not embrace
other, competing values, then, at least from a justice viewpoint, its
desirability is considerably diminished.
What is the significance of these observations? Two matters stand out.
First, the exercise of party autonomy, particularly in divisive community
conflicts, is a central value and must be supported. No one can or should be
able to compel a police chief or a social activist to "come to the table" to
negotiate matters that might be visibly, and dangerously, polarizing
community residents. But that observation must not be misunderstood or
overstated. As noted above, it is possible for a party with significant power to
insist, in principle, on designing or executing the mediation process in a
manner that systematically reinforces power disparities and those at a power
disadvantage might agree to proceed or participate because they perceive it
as a necessary condition to having the opportunity for their voice to be
heard.40 But party endorsement of proceeding does not warrant doing so. The
mediator has an independent obligation to insure process integrity:
40 Although it might seem an implausible possibility in contemporary U.S. society,
consider a hypothetical in which one party-a commercial enterprise in a given
community with a substantial-size workforce-refuses to meet with the representative of
a community advocate organization that is demanding an aggressive policy of hiring
local immigrant residents unless the spokesperson for that group is a Caucasian lawyer
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Although party self-determination for process design is a
fundamental principle of mediation practice, a mediator may need to
balance such party self-determination with a mediator's duty to
conduct a quality process in accordance with these Standards.'
The assertion that "it is the parties' process" ignores this crucial injunction-
and can result in a procedure that can reproduce in practice the "thin" vision
of mediation previously analyzed.
Second, for a person invited to serve as a mediator, it is an important,
normative choice as to whether he should accept the request. There is
nothing "neutral" about a person making this decision. It constitutes a
political judgment of significant importance requiring the mediator to weigh
competing considerations regarding potential benefits or harms to the
respective stakeholders were they to proceed, the desirability of the available
alternatives, and the like. But every mediator, whatever his practice context,
makes this political decision about this "entry issue." Though the criteria and
consequences are more exposed when deciding whether to intervene in a
highly public, fluid controversy, the identical need arises when parties and
their counsel to a litigated case request a mediator's services-filing a
lawsuit might camouflage the mediator's decision-making process, but it
does not eliminate it.
The significant consequence can be stated as follows: while it is
important to affirm that different individuals can make different-and
reasonable-decisions regarding entry issues,4 2 the need to make the decision
reaffirms that the values surrounding process integrity-matters that relate to
justice principles-clash with, and can appropriately outweigh, the important
principle of self-determination.
If the "mediator" map makes self-determination trump all values, then efforts
to mediate divisive community issues will be ineffective. Why? In these
explosive controversies, power relationships are front and center. If those
with significant economic, social and political advantages can establish,
under the umbrella of 'self-determination,' procedural practices and
from the community-and the community organization agreed. Would or should a
mediator proceed?
41 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (I)(A)(1) (AM. ARB. Ass'N, ET.
AL. 2005).
42 For a discussion of a mediator's responsibility for structuring process fairness and
remaining neutral regarding substantive outcomes, see Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory
and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REv. 85, 110-16
(1981).
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substantive agenda items that reinforce the inequities of the parties' original
position, they can eviscerate the opportunity for conducting respectful
dialogue; and, ironically they can do so while simultaneously, yet justifiably,
escaping moral criticism for such conduct.
VI. A MEDIATOR'S PHILOSOPHICAL MAP THAT CAPITALIZES ON
SANDER THEMES
We return to Professor Sander's untapped themes. Multiple roads
emerge.
First, when the judicial branch of government explores and supports
flexibility and creativity in matching non-trial dispute resolution procedures
to citizen disputes, it can do so in two ways: first, it can divert the traditional
litigated case to some dispute resolution process other than a trial, at least in
the first instance.43 Second, it can-or should-make other dispute resolution
processes available to parties so that they can address grievances that have
not been aired at all.4
There is a third way, one that reaffirms Professor Sander's additional
observation that courts, meaning judges and our traditional trial process, no
longer are the principal public dispute processor. There are many sites with
skilled players at which persons can raise and address their grievances,
including but not limited to political institutions and their elected political
leaders and civil servants; administrative agency processes; private sector
dispute resolution programs and their providers; community mediation
programs; and ODR platforms. These multiple dispute resolution venues
serve various audiences and numerous challenges. They operate with
distinctive focal points and strengths.
And, significantly, for some institutional platforms, it is entirely
appropriate, and crucial, that its participants-leadership-affirmatively take
the process to the stakeholders to explore possible service rather than wait
for an invitation to assist.45
Why is it useful to note these separate paths? We believe that law-trained
individuals have distinctive contributions to make to each sector-but if that
is true, then ADR advocates must advance a conception of mediation that is
43 For instance, Minnesota Rule 114 requires potential litigants to identify some
ADR process it will use incident to trial. MN ST. GEN. PRAC. RULE 114.
4 Sander, supra note 6, at 113: "...[W]e may be encouraging the ventilation of
grievances that are now being suppressed."
45 See ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING
DISPUTES 16 (2013).
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more robust than its 'thinning vision.' It must be one that includes and
reaffirms two fundamental norms: first, that the mediation process, suitably
conducted, is a 'justice' process; second, that the mediation process, at least
in its more 'formal' setting, is a 'public' process.
What do these two features involve?
To assert that mediation is a 'justice' process is to reject viewing it
primarily or exclusively as a process that should be used "to forge
agreement." As one judge-serving-as-mediator described his job to one of
our students representing a client in a court-ordered mediation, "I view my
role as that of a car salesman: I want to get each of you to agree to a number
that will settle the case-that's all."4 6
That is a bankrupt conception of mediation: it ignores who participates,
what concerns get discussed, what settlement options might be workable, and
the manner in which the dialogue between disputants is conducted. 47
Conducting a mediated conversation in this manner has no purchase or
effectiveness when facilitating a conversation among such stakeholders as
parents protesting the closing of their elementary school or concerned
citizens demanding alternative practices for providing water to city residents.
Second, mediation is a 'public' process, not in the sense that it must be
conducted in an open forum but rather in that its practitioners must structure
46 Comment reported to Stulberg in November 2010 by one of his civil litigation
clinic students and his supervising attorney following their participation in a mediation of
a civil action claim conducted by a trial court judge in that jurisdiction.
47 Jeffrey Krivis, a well-known commercial mediator, advances a more nuanced
statement of this approach that we are criticizing when he states, when answering a
question regarding the impact of the marketplace on mediator conduct:
"The market that drives my practice is the civil litigated case. It is highly
competitive based on the concept of give and take. That concept means that
limited financial resources are negotiated and traded back and forth until a deal
is done. Non-monetary resources are also traded but that is the exception rather
than the rule. This market succeeds about 97 percent of the time unless a case is
resolved through an adjudicatory procedure like trial. Litigators, as gatekeepers
to the adversarial system, set this market in motion. These litigators have
legitimate economic interests, both personally and on behalf of their clients.
Mediation within this marketplace often results in a zero-sum exchange where
each participant's gain or loss is balanced by a gain or loss to the other side. It's
that simple." DisP. RESOL. MAG. 21 (Winter 2016).
For important alternative responses to that question, see Watson, 21-22 DIsp.
REsOL. MAG. (Winter 2016) and Meyer, DISP. RESOL. MAG. (Winter 2016).
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their conduct in a way that reflects or is consistent with fundamental norms
of fair treatment and dignity.4 8 No public justice system-i.e. court-permits
one party to dictate procedural or substantive guidelines systematically that
skew due process principles or process quality. Neither should the 'private'
system of mediation permit that to occur.4 9
VII. CONCLUSION.
During the past 50 years, there has been an explosion of experiments,
interest, and practice in dispute resolution processes and practices. The
"field" has expanded in part because many thoughtful, caring individuals
have become more conscious and thoughtful about how we, as human
beings, deal with differences.
We do not believe that there is a "one-size-fits-all" approach for how
mediators, in particular, execute the process to help persons resolve the
disparate range of disputes that dot our daily lives. But we do believe-
firmly-that the mediation process has fundamentally defining attributes
that distinguish it from other dispute resolution processes and that support
and advance essential norms that, in the standard situation, must be
honored. The current imprint of mediation's 'thinning vision' might be the
current highway in mediation practice; but if our "horizonso" is one in
which we continue to advocate the regular use of mediation as a distinctive
process for resolving disputes that otherwise affect the public square, we
can do so only if we embrace an approach that allows us to follow the road
less traveled.
48 It is more than "the customer is always right" mentality. A mediator, by himself,
or more importantly, the "public square," approve using the mediation process predicated
on affirming the belief that the procedure, in design and implementation, is one whose
fundamental framework passes the 'overlapping consensus' criterion of fair treatment
and dignity. No one would endorse supporting the use of mediation if, in form or
function, it operated as a disguised gunfight.
49 For an elaborate version of this argument and analysis, see Joseph B. Stulberg,
Mediation and Justice: What Standards Govern?, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 213
(2005).
so The JDR symposium title, "Horizon," asks each of us to look ahead, and our hope
is that the future of mediation practice includes the vision we have set forth.
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